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
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
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THE KOREAN QUESTION--REVISITED

by

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MAJOR, USA



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

March 1987

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE KOREAN QUESTION--REVISITED

The "question" is whether to keep U.S. troops, particularly ground combat forces, in Korea as has been the practice since 1950 or to withdraw them as some propose. With increasing internal dissent in the R.O.K., a corresponding increase in the scrutiny of the American relationship with the incumbent Korean government will result. The intent of this study is to examine the purposes those forces serve--militarily and politically, and in a peninsular, regional and global context-- and, to what extent they aid in the protection of U.S. interests. The issue is reviewed from a macro perspective; a strategy and policy inquiry. "Tactics" is not the subject. Korea's importance to the United States is examined. U.S. policy and strategy is reviewed with emphasis on Korea's role. The benefits that U.S. forces produce are presented in contrast to those factors that could lead to the outbreak of hostilities. Additional factors that can impact on U.S. force presence are discussed. The study concludes that despite the risks involved, the forces stationed in the Republic of Korea serve a multitude of purposes that further American interests. Increased internal unrest within South Korea will undoubtedly create calls in the United States for sanctions based on human rights abuses. These are insufficient grounds for the removal of U.S. forces from a key strategic location, in the author's view, and American policymakers should not fall prey to the whimsy of the "politically conscious elite."


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THE KOREAN QUESTION--REVISITED

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE QUESTION

Should the United States withdraw all, or most, of its forces from South Korea? With President Carter's 1979 decision to maintain the forces there, one could easily surmise that the question of U.S. troop presence in Korea has been answered. But the argument did not end with Carter's decision. It was only an interim determination. The question will be reevaluated when the dynamics are such to cause a resurfacing in the political limelight.

Proponents who would respond to the question in the affirmative have and continue to be found with a wide variety of affiliations. As Carter proclaimed in defense of his decision to remove the troops, "Many leaders in our country and in the Republic of Korea have advocated complete removal of ground troops from Korea" and then cited Melvin Laird, former Republican Secretary of Defense (1969-73) and Korean President (1961-1979) Park Chung Hee.¹ The 1972 presidential candidate Senator George McGovern took a like stance.² Today, one can find knowledgeable and committed academic strategists and military officers who are still of the opinion that withdrawal

is the proper course to take.³

The focus for their views range from Carter's emphasis on human rights and the ability of South Korea to defend itself, to displeasure over inequity of the defense burden, to the real concern over the possibility of involvement in another war on the Asian continent. Each can make a credible case. Each has compelling substantiation for his position.

Continuing signs of internal discontent and opposition to the incumbent power will focus American attention on the Republic of Korea (ROK). A natural aversion to conflict on the part of the United States public will result in scrutiny of the nature and methods of that government. It will be easy to seek to distance the United States from South Korea and its actions. Americans, especially the "politically conscious elite,"* gravitate toward expedient, uncomplicated responses to what are oftentimes culturally and historically deep rooted problems. All other considerations are subordinated to issues of "human rights." This segment of the population tends to view situations from a narrow frame of reference and only in comparison to its absolutist "moral" views. The reality and necessity of interest prioritization from a broader national perspective are ignored.

* A term used by Professor Steven Morris, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, to denote a decidedly liberal leaning segment of the U.S. populace concentrated in academia, the media and the arts. As prime American opinion architects, they actively and fervently take action within their means to affect U.S. policy in accord with their agenda.

The Korean question is not a dead issue. Nor should it be. Considering the grave, real and everpresent consequences that could result--a large scale violent war that would involve American troops, and dependents, from the onset--recurring examination is appropriate and necessary.

PURPOSE

This study will explore the merit of continuing the current U.S. force level in South Korea, particularly that of the ground combat forces.

APPROACH

The inquiry will follow a specified general investigative path in an effort to address the issue and produce valid conclusions. The process contains four steps.

1. "Fix" United States' interests and objectives in Korea, with regard to peninsula, regional and global implications.
2. Present the broad strategy supporting those objectives.
3. Surface factors that do and will affect force presence in the R.O.K.
4. Draw conclusions and offer recommendations on the desirability of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This study reviews the question of troop presence in an all or nothing scenario, i.e., status quo versus withdrawal. It does not consider those alternatives in the middle of the spectrum. For example, the alternative of moving the 2d

Infantry Division to a rear reserve location south of Seoul. Indisputably, this option would reduce the vulnerability of that unit to the direct violent consequences of a mass invasion from the North. But it would also not serve the same deterrent role it presently does, would cost vast sums to relocate and by virtue of presence still be a political pawn in international and Korean politics.

This is not a force development study in its strictest sense. No attempt is made to justify to the man, unit or weapon system each position and how it aids in the overall accomplishment of the mission assigned to U.S. forces.

The "all or nothing" parameter is not an attempt to reduce a complex issue to a simplistic either/or deliberation. What it is is an attempt to address the central issues and not diffuse the discussion to answer a number of subordinate questions that are tangents of the main theme. The central issues are: How important is Korea to the United States?; What purpose do American forces stationed there serve?; Do the benefits derived from that force presence exceed the risks of being drawn into another war?

ASSUMPTIONS

Here, the desire is to keep assumptions to both a minimum and at a general level that would be acceptable to a consensus of those familiar with the subject matter.

-- American foreign policy will not experience a significant shift in practice. Deterrence will continue to be the

watchword of our defense strategy. Although it is natural to see various directions and emphases in rhetoric by each incumbent administration, both the overall political philosophy that views the United States as a prime player and shaper in world events and our responses to the Soviet threat will not vary to a great degree.

-- The Pacific basin will continue to grow in economic importance to the United States and in the worldwide context.

-- The interrelationships between the U.S.S.R., U.S., China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan will not experience drastic and sudden policy changes toward each other, save the possible exception of the outbreak of hostilities. Changes will result in slower and subtle ways and not from impulsive switches in alignments or ideology.

-- While alignment and alliance compositions are not likely to change, the internal strength of those relationships, both in Soviet and U.S. camps, could be diluted.

-- Because NATO has been the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since World War II, does not mean it should be or will continue to be.⁴

ORGANIZATION

The study contains eight remaining chapters.

The background offers a post World War II sketch of how and why the United States became involved in Korea. It provides a frame of reference for present U.S. strategic policy of which Korea still serves a purpose. Discussed is rationale

for involvement in the hostilities of 1950 as derived from a strategic concept to counter the worldwide Soviet threat. After the Korean War, the U.S and the R.O.K established a mutual defense treaty that is in tact today. Simply, it states the responsibilities of each party in the defense of the other under specified conditions. In the wake of Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine carried implications directed to Asia and of particular meaning to Korea. As a departure point in the present context, President Jimmy Carter's decision to first withdraw the ground combat forces from the peninsula and then his subsequent position reversal that stayed the execution of that move are reviewed.

Of prime importance in the next chapter is the need to recognize the United States' "vital interests" with respect to Korea. The value of that relationship from an American perspective cannot be viewed from a restrictive peninsular context. To appreciate that nation's full standing, it is essential to consider it in a regional and global frame of reference.

Closely associated with the interests of the United States in Korea is the policy and strategy used to protect them. This chapter deals with that strategy and policy . Particular attention is given to the larger policy scheme in addition to that that is specific to the peninsula.

The succeeding chapter discusses the military and political role that U.S. forces serve as a means toward policy

accomplishment.

The risk of United States involvement in major hostilities is as likely in Korea as anywhere on earth. Factors on both sides of the 38th Parallel that can lead to war are examined.

Next, issues impacting on U.S. strategy and policy are addressed. This can cause considerable consternation as discussion of one problem or situation invariably opens the flood gate for more questions. The task often becomes one of restricting the breadth and depth of the investigation so that it does not become lost in an exercise of "what if" scenarios.

As stated in the purpose of this study, investigative efforts are directed to the formulation of a position on the merit of U.S. troop presence in Korea. The last chapter presents conclusions and offers recommendations.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

POLICY RETROSPECTIVES

To better appreciate how and why the United States is still in Korea close to thirty- five years after the end of the war there, it is appropriate to review some of the factors that shaped that relationship.

KENNAN, NSC-68, CONTAINMENT. Post World War II strategic thinking was established in the minds of many policymakers with George F. Kennan's famous "X" article in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. It is here where the United States and the concept of containment became engaged. In 1950, as a result of a quandary over how to meet Soviet expansionism, President Truman authorized the study and formulation of policy that would comprehensively state interests, threats and feasible responses throughout the government.¹ The result was NSC-68; a Policy Planning Staff document developed with the intent of systematizing containment in a strategic policy.

NSC-68's stated goal was to create and maintain conditions under which the U.S could operate a "free and democratic system." It also proclaimed that American interests were associated with diversity, not uniformity, of governmental and societal systems. Its lead paragraph recalled the European system that preceeded World War I as proof that countries with

divergent interests can coexist in the face of hegemony. But, it also assumed the stance that "any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled." It further concluded that "in the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." Enter symmetrical containment. The emphasis was on meeting challenges where they arise, not just at strongpoints that are determined to be necessary to the most critical U.S. interests. It was the view of NSC-68 that the balance of power could change from Soviet intimidation and the loss of credibility and not only as a result of economic or military actions. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the marriage of U.S. foreign policy and containment was consummated.

KOREAN WAR. Korea was the test case for the United States' post-WW II policy of Soviet containment. Prior to the North Korean invasion, Korea had been regarded as only of peripheral interest to the U.S. The attack was timely in that it validated many of the assumptions and conclusions in NSC-68. When viewed in the context of NSC-68 philosophy, Korea had now become a vital interest. To allow Korea to fall under Communist domination would be a challenge to U.S. will, credibility and prestige and, it was perceived, would result in a shift in the balance of power.

Kennan stressed the point that not all parts of the world

were equally vital to American security. In 1948 he identified the areas and specific countries and only two were singled out in the Pacific: Japan and the Philippines. He later stated in an address to students at the National War College that there were "only five centers of industrial and military power in the world [including the U.S.] which are important to us from the standpoint of national security." They were England, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan. This list was not meant to represent the only interests the U.S. had globally. Kennan was fully aware of needs such as secure spheres of influence, access to raw materials and strongpoints throughout the world. His concern was an emphasis on the most threatening power sources, those of the industrial-military form.²

In a bi-polar world, U.S. policymakers felt that NATO unity in the West and a rearming and pro-Western Japan in the East were essential to counter Soviet intentions. It was surmised that a dramatic shift in the balance of power would result if either area fell under Communist influence.

The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea after World War II suggested the dispensable status of that nation. Korea had been left out of America's Pacific defense perimeter which ran from the Aleutians to Japan, including the Ryukus, and to the Philippines. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly declared that Korea was beyond the perimeter.³ South Korea had fallen into a position of vulnerability through neglect.

American inaction in Korea after the attack from the North, it was felt, would be perceived globally with skepticism detrimental to U.S. interests. In the immediate arena, U.S. indifference would do nothing for the courting of Japan, for they would surely view U.S. talk of defense commitment as merely that--talk. Allies in NATO might also view this with doubts on American resolve. It was feared that this could create an atmosphere where Soviet overtures would be more readily received as Europeans would seek to hedge their bets.

The United States did not commit forces to Korea as a result of any legal obligations to defend that nation. Nor was the peninsula seen as being of significant strategic interest.⁴ Truman viewed Korea as the "Greece of the Far East" and believed that a weak American response to a Communist move in Asia would undermine the confidence of West European allies.⁵ Washington's policymakers regarded direct intervention as the only alternative to appeasement.

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

As noted previously, the United States was under no legal obligation to aid South Korea when the North Koreans invaded in June, 1950. Measures were swiftly taken upon termination of the Korean War in 1953 to formally proclaim the obligation of each to defend the other. Ratified on January 26, 1954, the Treaty remains in effect today.

The Treaty is a relatively short agreement that contains six articles. The overall purpose is clearly stated in its

prefacing lines: "Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area...."*

The Treaty announces that the Parties will consult with each other when the "political independence or security" of either is threatened by external armed attack. And, that separately and jointly they will maintain and develop means to counter and deter that armed aggression. It recognizes that an "armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other" would be met in accordance with constitutional processes.

The Treaty is in force for an indefinite period and either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other.

NIXON DOCTRINE

In 1969, the United States was deeply stuck in the quagmire of Vietnam. By that time 530,000 U.S. military personnel were involved in the war and it was costing an average of \$2,500 million a month.⁶ The costs of material and manpower in Vietnam facilitated the expansion of Soviet influence elsewhere. It

* See Appendix I for a complete copy of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

had become evident that the United States no longer could meet each global challenge.

In response to these changing events, President Nixon announced a new set of U.S. foreign policy principles in July 1969, later known as "the Nixon Doctrine." The main thrust was to restate American intention to honor all of its treaty commitments, but also to underscore that the nation directly threatened was to assume "the primary responsibility" for providing the manpower for its defense.

Nixon's pronouncements had a distinctly Asian orientation and were perceived by Asian allies as possessing crucial long-term implications. Asian allies were not comforted by American promises of commitment to defense. Actions speak louder than words. U.S. forward based forces gave physical credibility to those assurances. Their withdrawal seemed imminent. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did not ease their state of mind nor reflect a steadfast U.S. concern in that region in his explanation of the policy: "The Nixon Doctrine means that Asian boys will fight Asian boys."⁷

The Nixon Doctrine reflected the impact of Vietnam and in large measure was developed to prevent the occurrence of future Vietnams. As Nixon astutely observed, America's "vital interests" constituted the test for involvement when he said, "Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."⁸

CARTER'S POLICY

WITHDRAWAL. President Carter posed the question that is the litmus test for many that ponder the troop withdrawal argument. On May 26, 1977 in his eighth news conference since taking office, he declared, "The essence of the question is, is our country committed on a permanent basis to keep troops in South Korea even if they are not needed to maintain the stability of that peninsula?"

Jimmy Carter recognized the role of Korea with respect to U.S. interests as he stated, "Peace and security in Northeast Asia are vital to our national interests, and stability on the Korean peninsula is essential to that goal." He followed that observation with a vow that he was "determined...to maintain our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea." The problem, then, shifts from one of difference of opinion over policy objectives to difference of opinion over the optimal means of objective accomplishment. And in his own words, "I have concluded that the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from Korea over a four to five year period can be accomplished in a manner which will not endanger the security of the Republic of Korea."⁹

Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces was based on these stated considerations:

- Korea's impressive economic growth over the past decade and the corresponding increase in Korea's ability to defend itself;

- our continued firm determination to maintain our basic security commitment to Korea, and to retain a significant

military presence there, composed mainly of air and key support units, together with the continuing presence of U.S. naval units in the area; we believe that these forces, as well as the major U.S. forces remaining in the Western Pacific, provide a clear and visible U.S. deterrent to North Korean miscalculation;

-- our assessment of the broader international context of the Korean question, particularly the pattern of inter-relationships between the great powers in the area;

-- our readiness, subject to Congressional consultations and approval, to take appropriate actions to assure that the ground force withdrawal does not weaken Republic of Korea defense capabilities. [This refers directly to Carter's requested no-cost transfer of \$800 million worth of military equipment to the South Korean forces to compensate for the troops being withdrawn]¹⁰

WITHDRAWAL ON HOLD. Many allies, U.S. politicians, defense and foreign policy advisers responded with alarm to Carter's intentions. The outcry prompted the President to reconsider his position. In February, 1979 the administration announced that the withdrawal would be held in abeyance pending a "complete reassessment of North Korea's military strength and the implications of recent political developments in the region."¹¹ As a result of that reassessment, in July of the same year it was decided that withdrawals would remain in abeyance and that the issue would be re-examined in 1981.

In a statement issued by the President, as read by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the rationale for that decision was based on three considerations:

-- First, recent studies by the intelligence community have confirmed that the size of North Korea's ground forces, armor, firepower, and mobility are larger than previously estimated. Given the inherent economic strength of the Republic of Korea

and with U.S. support, the existing imbalance in North-South military strength can be remedied. Holding further withdrawals of U.S. ground combat units in abeyance will help reinforce deterrence, avoid conveying misleading signals to the North, and provide additional time for the ROK to put its ground defenses in order. For its part the Republic of Korea recognizes the need to augment its self-defense efforts, and President Park has stated that his government would expand defense spending significantly beyond previously planned levels and accord special urgency to improving its ground defenses.

-- Second, during the recent visit to Seoul, President Park and President Carter jointly announced their desire to explore possibilities for reducing tensions in Korea with representatives of North Korea. Only through authoritative discussions between representatives of the North and South Korean Governments can a framework for peaceful coexistence between the North and South be established and progress toward eventual reunification of Korea be achieved. The United States is prepared to assist in that diplomatic effort. It is the judgment of the United States that further reductions of our combat elements in Korea should await credible indications that a satisfactory military balance has been restored and a reduction in tension is under way.

-- Third, in recent months we have normalized relations with China and deepened defense cooperation with Japan. Concurrently we have witnessed the steady growth of Soviet military power in East Asia and the eruption of renewed conflict and new uncertainties in Southeast Asia. Under these circumstances, it is believed that these adjustments in our Korean withdrawal plan--together with the recent stabilization of our base agreements with the Philippines, initiation of defense planning discussions with Japan, and increased support for the security of ASEAN countries--will serve wider U.S. strategic interests by reassuring our principal allies of our steadiness and our resolve.¹²

In summation, Carter concluded that the "modification" of the withdrawal plan "will best assure the maintenance of our security commitment, preserve an adequate deterrent, nurture the resumption of a serious North-South dialog, and stabilize a favorable U.S. strategic position in East Asia."

CHAPTER III

KOREA AND U.S. INTERESTS

A clearer appraisal of Korea's stature as it relates to the interests of the United States can be seen if one views the nation in its area and regional context. The opinions expressed below reflect recognition of the burgeoning eminence of the Pacific.

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the center of gravity of world economic- and probably eventually military and political- attention and power, is moving towards the East Asian rimland of the Pacific...what the world is witnessing are the early stages of a geopolitical and geostrategic transformation in the international security order in favor of the importance of Asia, and particularly of Northeast Asia.¹

The Pacific basin is where America's 21st Century interests will be focused.²

We are now on the verge of the "Age of the Pacific." I fully support Mike Mansfield's assessment that the next 100 years will be the century of the Pacific.³

The economic output of the Pacific region as a whole now equals more than two-thirds of the United States' GNP where twenty years ago it was only one third. In the 1980s, total U.S. trade with the Pacific Basin has surpassed trade with all other global regions. In 1983, for example, total U.S.-Pacific Basin trade exceeded U.S.-European trade by \$26 billion. This has been a trend that continues to increase in Asia's favor.

The Asia-Pacific region is the largest overseas market for U.S. agricultural exports. Of America's top 20 trading partners worldwide, 7 are in the Pacific Basin. Japan is second, the ASEAN states fourth, Taiwan sixth and South Korea seventh.⁴

NORTHEAST ASIA

Listed in Table III-1 are some general U.S. interests, objectives and threats to U.S. interests in Northeast Asia.

TABLE III-1

U.S. INTERESTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

<u>INTERESTS</u>	<u>OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>THREATS</u>
Preserve balance of power	Deter aggression, prevent destabilizing shift	Increase in Soviet military regional power
Maintain & increase U.S. influence in region	Maintain commitments, project visible & credible U.S. presence	Perception of US retrenchment
Preserve security & integrity of Japan	Maintain security-economic linkage	Soviet military & North Korean threats to stability
U.S. economic growth	Promote trade & growth, don't disrupt allied economies	Loss of US security credibility, trade policy restrictions
Security of US forces & bases	Possess will & capability to protect US forces & host nations	Misperception of US will
Freedom of movement over LOCs	Deter threat to LOCs of US & allies	Expanded Soviet Pacific Fleet
Survival & growth of Free World economic system	Economic cooperation, access to raw materials	Allied trade competition, protectionism

Human rights	Integrate human rights into bilateral & multi- lateral relationships	US subordinates human rights goal to other foreign policy consider- ations
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(Source: Adapted from William M. Carpenter, et al., U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia (Arlington, VA: SRI International, 1978) p. 41, Table II-1.)

JAPAN/KOREA CONNECTION

It is unavoidable to discuss the significance of Korea as an American interest without in the same breath mentioning Japan. American policymakers had Japan in mind when the U.S. military was sent to Korea in 1950. Korea's value has long been considered derivative of Japan's worth.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger has established six "tests" that are to be considered when contemplating the use of U.S. combat troops. The first criterion is that the "vital interests" of the United States, or its allies, must be at risk.⁵ Since Japan tends to be the everpresent nation in U.S. policymaker consciousness and Korea is the nation of direct examination in this study, the interests of both (from their perspectives) warrant recognition. Empathy is especially important if the United States seeks to nurture their cooperation in coalition endeavors in the military, economic and political arenas.

Table III-2 presents some widely acknowledged interests and objectives of the Japanese.

TABLE III-2

JAPANESE INTERESTS IN NE ASIA

<u>INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>PERCEIVED THREATS</u>
Stable power balance in NE Asia.	Weakening U.S. security commitment
Maintenance of mutual security & economic ties to U.S.	Soviet military/political harassment of Japan or LOCs
Balance of relations with U.S.S.R. and PRC	North Korean attacks South
Maintain unhindered LOCs	Sino-Soviet rapprochement
Economic linkage with South Korea	Increased Soviet ability to attack Japan
"Two Korea" solution	Deterioration or break in U.S.-R.O.K. relations
Be friendly with all in international relations to enhance opportunities for trade and investment	Political instability in South Korea
Economic development of SE Asian nations	Increased power projection for the PRC
Increased political/military/economic roles in East Asia	

(Source: Adapted from William M. Carpenter, U.S. Strategy In Northeast Asia, Arlington, VA: SRI International, June 1978; p. 59, Table II-2.)

The first national interest listed in Table III-2 is concern over preservation of a stable balance of power in the region. As noted at the time, Japanese officials viewed with concern Carter's troop withdrawal as part of a larger trend; one of decreasing U.S. military strength with a corresponding increase in the strength of the Soviet Union.⁶

Why is stability on the Korean Peninsula important to Japan? War in that country could result in an exodus of one

million South Korean refugees to Japan's western territories.⁷ Japan would not look forward to the large influx of South Koreans. It has enough trouble with the 675,000 ethnic Koreans that reside there now.⁸

The United States would once again be at war should the R.O.K. come under attack. The possibility exists that American facilities in Japan could be targeted. Stability on the Korean peninsula is a concern of Japan's.

Professor Edward Olsen noted that in the event of peaceful reunification, Korea could "rather easily become a threat to Japanese interests."⁹ In that event, Korea's population would total close to 60 million and the productivity and technology of the south could couple with the resources of the north. The armed forces would be formidable totaling over one million. A united Korea would also share a common antipathy toward Japan.

KOREA

A Soviet writer recognized, in a recent periodical, that the United States has strong ties with Korea. He wrote, "... US specialists admit that the USA has raised South Korea's military status to that of a European theatre of war and views it as a region of its 'vital interests' and not merely as a 'zone of special interest', as it did before."¹⁰

America's view of Korea's importance has always been of a relative nature. Relative to Japan, relative to Soviet expansionism or relative to the major regional powers. Compelling as they may be, they should not totally obscure

aspects that render Korea a primary American concern in its own right.

As newly nominated U.S. Ambassador to Korea, James R. Lilley noted before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the R.O.K. is an economic miracle.¹¹ Korea was one of the poorest nations in the world after the Korean War. In 1960, per capita income had not even reached \$100; by 1975 the figure was \$565. Per capita income in 1986 is over \$2,000. This year real GNP growth is expected to exceed 10%. Growth in the areas of trade is equally as impressive.

The United States created Korea. Militarily, economically and to a degree politically, the United States shaped and provided the assistance that laid the foundation of opportunity that the Korean's have, to their credit, capitalized on. Korea is by all relative standards a modern success story for which the United States should at least be referenced, if not billed as a contributing author.

Korean affluence and industrialization serve as a positive example of the possible consequences of pro-Western affiliation.

Table III-3 reflects some of the broad interests and threats to sovereignty held by the Korean government.

TABLE III-3

KOREAN INTERESTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

<u>INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>PERCEIVED THREATS</u>
Maintain U.S. force presence & mutual security commitment	Surprise attack by North Korea
Stable power balance in NE Asia	Premature U.S. withdrawal
R.O.K. military buildup	Major North Korean infil- tration campaign
"Two Korea" solution	Internal political instability
Nonaggression pact with North Korea	Sino-Soviet rapprochement
Improved relations with U.S.S.R. & P.R.C.	Break in relations with U.S. over human rights
Creation of favorable inter- national investment climate in the R.O.K.	Too rapid or great military buildup in Japan
Maintain & improve economic linkages with U.S. & Japan	

(Source: Adapted from William M. Carpenter, U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia, Arlington, VA: SRI International, June 1978; p. 76, Table II-5.)

CHAPTER IV

U.S. STRATEGY/POLICY OVERVIEW

GLOBAL

A working definition of strategy is "...the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources."¹ The process is complicated by conflicting demands based on subjective prioritization, assumptive logic, and actions by friends and foes that are beyond the control of those people entrusted with policy refinement. The development of national strategic policy is not an exact science.

Strategy and policy are not the ends but rather the means of acquiring or holding onto desired states and positions. They are formulated from national goals. In their most general terms, the national goals of the United States are:

To preserve the independence, free institutions, and territorial integrity of the United States;

To preserve U.S. and allied vital interests abroad;
and

To shape an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions can survive and prosper--an international order in which states coexist without the use of force and in which² citizens are free to choose their own governments.

The strategy used toward obtaining or maintaining these ends is a combination of political, economic and military

responses. Politically, the United States seeks to promote democratic institutions through domestic example and the reconstruction and development of democratic institutions globally. Economically, it strives to create a healthy, growing international economic system through trade, fiscal management and developmental aid. And militarily, the United States seeks to protect geopolitical concerns and avert domination by a hostile power through coalition security pacts.³

As a global power with many and varied interests and responsibilities, a coherent and easily understood policy is an elusive goal. Frustration with hazy, ill-defined strategy is the understandable reaction of the American public. It should be remembered that a degree of the "fog" of policy we see in any administration's strategy is purposeful and intentional. A rigid policy framework distracts from reality and lessens our ability to respond to change. From a political perspective, an administration also attempts to avoid excessive criticism from domestic and international antagonists. Avoiding an absolutist stance allows for maneuver space.

What, then, is the defense policy of the United States? Secretary of Defense Weinberger defined U.S. defense strategy and policy as follows:

Our strategy is simple. We seek to prevent war by maintaining forces and demonstrating the determination to use them, if necessary, in ways that will persuade our adversaries that the cost of any attack on our vital interests will exceed the

benefits they could hope to gain. The label for this strategy is deterrence. It is the core of our defense strategy today as it has been for most of the postwar period.

In order for deterrence to be effective, he went on to say, it must meet four tests: survivability, credibility, clarity and safety. U.S. forces must be able to threaten losses that outweigh any gains from an adversary by possessing the ability to survive a preemptive attack with sufficient retaliatory strength. The threatened response also has to be credible so that the potential aggressor sees that response backed by will and capability. The undesired action to be deterred must be clarified so that potential aggressors know what is unacceptable. While it is not advisable to state categorically which acts of aggression will be tolerated, it is prudent to delineate certain intentions. The final test is one of safety, that is, the risk of failure in an endeavor through accident or miscalculation must be minimized.⁵ This is the basic philosophy of U.S. strategy in the global context and as it applies to regional and specific situations.

USE OF MILITARY FORCE. In an effort to determine when, or more appropriate when not, to use U.S. combat forces, six "tests" were developed by the present administration. They are:

- The United States should not commit forces to combat unless its, or those of its allies, vital interests are at stake.
- If it is determined necessary to commit forces to combat,

they must be committed in sufficient numbers and with the support required to win.

- Political and military objectives must be clearly defined to determine what is to be achieved and how combat forces are to accomplish the mission. Size of contingent is then structured accordingly.
- The relationship between objectives and the size, composition and disposition of forces must be continually reassessed and adjusted as necessary.
- The American people and their elected representatives in Congress should support the commitment of combat forces abroad. A reasonable assurance of public support is essential.
- The use of U.S. forces should be a last resort. Diplomatic, political, economic and any other means feasible should be used to protect vital interests before resorting to military force.⁶

NATO AND THE PACIFIC. Strategic planning has been preoccupied with NATO and the European Central Front. This is especially true of Army leadership. To compound this single-mindedness is the mental disconnect between regional strategies and their interrelatedness. Each has tended to be viewed in isolation without due recognition of the beneficial byproducts they do, or would, produce, i.e., countering or causing the Soviets to modify their strategy.

As with every power, the U.S.S.R. seeks to wage war on

terms that offer them their greatest advantage, ideally matching their strengths against Western weaknesses. A general war scenario most desired by Soviet planners is a swift and decisive invasion of Western Europe.⁷

United States strategy must be able to counter this threat. NATO forces positioned to meet the Soviets is the direct aspect of confrontation. A supporting element is to protract hostilities and expand the conflict from the Soviet battlefield of choice to other sites of U.S. choosing. The prospect of a two front war looms heavy on Soviet minds. They are ever conscious of European history and the undoing of former great powers by waging war on two fronts. The United States must be capable of, and willing to initiate a war on a second front in Asia as a further deterrent to Soviet aggression. American resolve and intent will be understood by the Soviets. They in turn will have to grapple with the ramifications of any contemplated actions in Europe.

As national security affairs expert Colin S. Gray points out, a U.S. forward strategy in the Pacific can benefit NATO by:

- discouraging the Soviets to "swing" divisions from their eastern regions to the Western Front as they did in World War II;
- encouraging China and other nations not to issue assurances or take military actions that speak of neutrality;
- encouraging Japan to adopt a greater role in her self-

defense;

- denying the U.S.S.R. the naval and air options of blockading the Japanese economy; and
- to weaken the Soviet advantage in the Pacific so that the outcome in that theater could be used by the West in negotiations on conditions for the termination of the war.⁸

NORTHEAST ASIA

Under the Reagan Administration, three basic policy objectives in Northeast Asia have been observed. The first deals with the ambivalence of the United States toward this region in the previous decade. A reversal of that trend is sought as the goal now is to reflect consistency and commitment to allies in the region and openly recognize their importance.

The next basic objective is a common theme in U.S. strategy: to check Soviet expansion. This openly confrontational approach declares that Soviet expansion will be met in Asia as it would be in other regions that are closely intertwined with the national interests of the United States.


The last objective is to reestablish the United States as a leader in the region. Past inclinations toward retrenchment are reversing with reaffirmation of commitments to Korea and Japan and efforts to improve relations with China.

JAPAN. Japan remains the main concern of the United States in the Pacific and that nation's survival depends on maritime trade. The nation is totally dependent on imports for its supply of vital raw materials such as crude oil, iron ore

and coal and must import 90 percent of its wheat. Japan accounts for more than 20 percent of the world's maritime traffic by volume.⁹

The Sea of Japan has been referred to as one of the most strategic bodies of water in the world.¹⁰ Figure IV-1 shows the validity of that statement.

FIGURE IV-1
SEA OF JAPAN



Soviet naval forces are contained by the physical geography formed by the Japanese and Soviet occupied island chain north of Japan. The passages between those islands are

either too shallow and/or are subject to ice blockage. Their main route of egress would be south through the passage separating Korea and Japan. Still, they are indeed channelized.

The largest of the Soviet fleets is the Pacific, headquartered at Vladivostok. This force poses a direct threat to Japanese vital interests.

TABLE IV-1

U.S.S.R. Pacific Fleet

Aircraft Carriers	2
Principal Surface Combatants	83
Other Combatant Ships	120
Auxiliaries	90
Submarines	90*
Naval Aviation	510
Naval Infantry Division	1

* Not including SSBNs

(Source: DOD, Soviet Military Power 1986, p.13.)

Four basic purposes of the Soviet Pacific Fleet have been identified. The Pacific Fleet serves to "reaffirm the Soviet's openended presence as a Pacific power; to use that presence as means to exert influence over its Asian neighbors; to project its Asian based forces outward; and to secure access to offshore sites for surface and underwater mobile launch platforms for 'strategic' (i.e., nuclear) warfare."¹¹ Over the past ten years, the fleet has doubled its operating days out of home waters with 50-60 Soviet ships underway conducting operations in the Pacific on any given day.¹²

Globally, the Soviets have identified ten continental TVDs

(Teatr Voennykh Deistvii; theaters of military operations) and four oceanic TVDs. The Far Eastern TVD covers Siberia, the Soviet Far East, Mongolia, China, the Koreas, Japan and Alaska. The Pacific Ocean TVD includes that ocean and the coastal areas of the Soviet Far East.¹³

The Far Eastern TVD is the largest continental TVD. Forces are postured there as a deterrent, mainly to China, and in the hopes of avoiding a prolonged two-front war. Thus, the bulk of the ground forces are positioned with China as the threat of concern. They have also boosted their ground forces against Western allies by deploying a coastal defense division south of the Kuril Islands in the Japanese Northern Territories to the northeast of Hokkaido. Four other Soviet divisions are stationed on the Pacific approaches to the U.S.S.R. in the Northern Territories, Kurils, Sakhalin Island and on the Kamchatka Peninsula.¹⁴

TABLE IV-2

SOVIET FAR EAST TVD

Divisions	53
Tanks	14,900
APC/IFV	17,300
Artillery	13,400
Tactical SSM	375
Tactical Aircraft	1,730

(Source: DOD, Soviet Military Power 1986, p.13.)

KOREAN STRATEGY

The primary goal of the United States in Korea is to deter war. The use and purpose of U.S. troops there, as discussed in

the succeeding chapter, is designed to serve that role.

Forward deployment of forces has been a part of U.S. deterrent strategy since the end of World War II. As stated by Secretary Weinberger, "In essence, forward deployment gives unmistakable credibility as well as increased capability to U.S. participation in the first line of our [and allies] common defense."¹⁵ Deployment of forces in overseas locations render them immediately available for coalition warfare. In that regard, they participate in training with allies and actively exercise the integration of command and control in tactical scenarios. Forward deployment is the foothold for follow-on forces. As the advance party in the host nation, they facilitate actual mobilization, and movement and participation in joint and combined overseas exercises.

CHAPTER V

SIGNIFICANCE OF U.S. FORCES

COMPOSITION

Since the last large scale removal of troops in the early 1970s, most notably the 7th Infantry Division, U.S. forces in the R.O.K have numbered around 40,000.

Tables V-1 and V-2 reflect, respectively, the current distribution of U.S. military personnel stationed in the Republic by branch of service and general combat organization.

Table V-1

U.S. Personnel by Service

Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total DOD
32,312	408	969	11,469	45,158

(Source: Defense 86 Almanac, (Arlington, VA: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Sept/Oct 1986) p., 26.)

Table V-2

U.S. Combat Organizations

Army

1 Army HQ	1 Support Command
1 Infantry Division	1 Signal Brigade 1 Air Defense Bde

Air Force

1 Air Division	1 TAC Control GP
2 Wings: 5 Fighter Sqds	1 SAR Squadron

(Source: Air Force Magazine (Arlington, VA: Air Force Assn, Feb. 1986, p. 65.)

It should be noted that removal of troops from Korea is not supported by monetary considerations.¹ Even optimists who are knowledgeable of the fiscal side of the maintenance of military forces concede it would cost at least as much to sustain the forces in the United States. The costs would be far greater regardless of location if extensive facilities do not already exist. Unless these forces are demobilized and removed from the American force structure, a budgetary incentive will not be realized.

MILITARY ROLE OF U.S. FORCES

DEFENDING THE R.O.K. The primary purpose of U.S. forces in Korea is to defend the South against Northern aggression, a constant theme for the past thirty plus years. In previous periods the U.S. military, and ground forces in particular, played an active and essential role in direct defense. With the passage of time the R.O.K has made quantum leaps in the quantity and quality of their armed forces. So although the goal of Korea's defense is still valid and the threat as prevalent as ever, the ability of the South to unilaterally meet it is a focal point that sows the question, "What is the role of U.S. forces in Korea?"

The defense of Korea has two components. The first is the need to possess a military force capable of withstanding and countering an attack so as to deny the takeover of the country by armed aggression. The second, and most preferred aspect, is

to maintain a military defense structure that is clearly able to accomplish the actions mentioned previously. The outbreak of hostilities would be averted through the enemy's sure knowledge that his attempts could not be successful.

As Korea's defense capability has evolved, so has the role of U.S. forces. The inherent war-fighting capabilities of U.S. air (especially) and ground forces are still an important factor in the scheme of peninsular defense planning. But, the more significant aspect is the potential and resolve they represent.

The 2d Infantry Division is commonly referred to as a "tripwire" that will automatically involve the United States in war should a large scale attack on the South occur. The 13,000 man unit is stationed north of Seoul in one of the three main invasion routes that could reasonably be expected to be used as an axis of advance for invaders from the north.

U.S. ground combat forces in forward deployed areas between Seoul and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) represent an assurance that the United States would fulfill its defense commitments in the event of a renewed conflict. In Korea, those forces perform a deterrent function that greatly exceeds the number of troops employed. It is a function that cannot be assumed by mobile air and naval forces based to the rear with the ability to avert confrontation should the United States decide not to become directly involved.

This fact is reassuring to the South Koreans who are

skeptical of the vacillating nature of U.S. commitment. The troops serve as an ominous warning to the North that the provisions of the Treaty with the South will be honored.

Almost a year to the day after U.S. troops were withdrawn from Korea, the North Koreans attacked.² This happened despite the fact that the Republic was within 100 miles of the largest concentration of American troops outside the United States, the four divisions of General Douglas Mac Arthur's army of occupation in Japan, and within the reach of American sea power.³

The lesson in this segment of Korea's history suggests that the potential to mobilize was not a sufficient deterrent. A high state of readiness that is actively posed to meet potential adversaries appears to serve the deterrent function better.

CONTINGENCY MISSION. There exists the possibility of using ground forces in operations outside of the R.O.K. This option will be increasingly feasible with South Korea's upward spiraling defense preparedness. As U.S. ground forces are not critical to the balance of forces on the peninsula, their missions can withstand a newfound flexibility.

"SWING" TO NATO. For those observers who question whether the United States "can afford to leave a much-needed Army combat unit in a region of lesser priority for deterrence when serious risks exist in more vital regions,"⁴ the option of swinging forces to bolster NATO in a European war might be

appealing.

POLITICAL ROLE OF U.S. FORCES

U.S. military force presence on the Asian mainland carries a larger political message than the preservation of peace in Korea. The United States is sending a signal that it is indeed a Pacific power and more specifically that the importance of Northeast Asia is of deep concern.

When Carter made public his intention to withdraw U.S. ground forces, it produced a number of reactions from the countries in the immediate area. It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between ideological posturing and the expression of actual conviction. One observer reported in regard to Chinese and Soviet reactions, "both Moscow and Peking indicated to Japanese that they were opposed to the "hasty" reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. They were not opposed to withdrawal in principle, but they did not genuinely desire the sort of immediate and total withdrawal demanded by Pyongyang."⁵

JAPAN. Considering the degree of importance the U.S. places on Japan as a vital interest, their concept of security is basic to policy determination in the region. As then Prime Minister Fukuda told Carter, the 40,000 U.S. forces in South Korea are seen as both a barrier to attack from the Communist North and a shield for Japan and other democratic nations in Asia.⁶

Without a sense of credible security, the Japanese could move toward other options. Development of a nuclear arsenal in

concert with increasing militarization could result in a more autonomous Japan; a nation less inclined to follow U.S. leads on any number of issues. Japan might also conclude it prudent to assume a more accomodating relationship with the Soviet Union. The latter in particular would do nothing toward protecting American interests.

CHINA. The United States has set out on a path to court China. Chinese leadership has been receptive as warmer relations with the United States can enhance their political and economic position.

China faces close to 50 Soviet Divisions postured toward the Sino-Soviet border. A secure Korean flank is an essential aspect of the defense of China. Historically, Korea has been the bridge used between a feuding Japan and China. American presence on the peninsula is an element of Chinese security.

From an Asian perspective, can the United States be perceived to be a serious and meaningful Pacific power and influence if it removes military forces that add credibility to that role? The risk of sacrifice is the true test of commitment. That risk is greatest for the United States in the R.O.K.

CHAPTER VI

THREATS TO PEACE

Despite its regional and global implications, first and foremost, the cause of instability on the Korean peninsula is fraternal dissent. And the main sources of a second civil war are found immediately above and below the 38th parallel. Reviewed here are major factors in both nations that might give rise to the outbreak of hostilities.

BALANCE OF FORCES

The force balance is presented to display the magnitude of pure numbers in personnel and armament each nation possesses.

TABLE VI-1

BALANCE OF FORCES

	South Korea		North Korea	
	Number	Description	Number	Description
Total Active Armed Forces	622,000		784,500	
ARMY				
Active	540,000		700,000	
Reserve	1,400,000		260,000	
	3 Army,	6 Corps HQ	9	Corps HQ
		2 Armd Div		
		2 Mech Inf Div	3	Motor Inf Div
	20	Inf Divs	34	Inf Divs
	11	Indep Bdes	9	Indep Inf Bde
	2	AA arty Bdes	2	AA Divs
	2	SSM BNs	3	Indep AA Regt
	2	SAM BDES	2	Indep Tank Reg
	1	Army Avn BDE	6	SSM BNS/FROG
Tanks	1,200	M-47-48	300	T-34
			2,200	T-54/55/62
			175	Type 59
			100	PT-76
			50	Type 62

Artillery	2,500	Up to 203mm	3,300	Up to 200mm
Navy				
Active	49,000	Incl Marines	33,500	
Reserves	25,000		40,000	
Submarines	0		21	
Destroyers	11	US		
Frigates	8		4	
	3	US AUK Corvettes	24	FAC(G)
	23	US LG patrolCraft	33	LG Patrol
	4	FAC(G)	155	FAC
	6	CPIC FAC(P)	182	FAC(G)
	4	Coastal Patrol	30	Coastal Ptrl
	8	Minesweepers	3	NamtzeLNDCrft
	33	US landing ships	2	Coastal MSL
	2	ASW SQNS		Def Regts
Marines				
Active	20,000			
Reserves	60,000			
	2	Divisions		
	1	Brigade		
Air Force				
Active	33,000		51,000	
Reserves	55,000			
	440	Combat A/C	740	Combat A/C
	7	Combat Wings	70	Il-28 lt bmb
	260	F-5A/B/E/F	290	MIG-15/17
	70	F-86F	100	MIG 19/Q-5
	72	F-4 D/E	160	MIG-21
	24	OV-10G	100	MIG-19
	10	RF-5A	250	AN-2
	26	UH-1H/B	40	Mi-4
			20	Mi-8
	5	Trp sqn		
Para-Military				
			100,000	Special Forces
	4,400,000	Civil Defense	38,000	Sec& border
	1,820,000	Student Def	4,000,000	Red Guard
	25	Small Craft		
	9	500D Helo		
		(Coast Guard)		

(Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1984-1985 (London:IISS, 1984), pp. 102-104.)

The U.S. State Department has announced that it will stop its foreign military sales (FMS) credits to Korea in fiscal year (FY) 1987.¹ Originally, \$230 million had been earmarked for Korea in FY 87, but cutbacks in the FMS program resulted in prioritization of funds to other countries. FMS credits totalling \$2.3 billion have been given to Korea since 1971.

NORTH KOREAN THREATS

To understand North Korea's leader is to understand the nation and its people. Indisputably, Kim Il-Sung, his persona, views and ideology, dominates and dictates every aspect of North Korean politics and policies. Kim's photograph is displayed ahead of the national flag and the national emblem, and his song is played ahead of the national anthem.² At Kim Il-Sung University, the premier and most selective institution in the nation, every entering student is examined about his knowledge of Kim's thoughts.³

Kim Il-Sung is more than a political leader. He is the father figure of the nation, perceived to be heaven's chosen one.

Any revolutionary political ideology, and the prominent group supporting it, is formed as and motivated by a challenge to the incumbent power. This is where the ideology of Kim Il-Sung differs from those of the founders of Marxism and Lenninism in Russia. There, both had obvious enemies; capitalism for the former and the Tsar's rule for the latter. At the onset of Kim's rule, however, he had no specified

enemies in his country. For the most part the enemies of the proletariat, capitalists and the bourgeoisie to name a few, had been eliminated by 1948 when he followed the Soviet Army of Occupation as the ruler of North Korea.

"Chuch'e" is commonly referred to as the concept of self-reliance. It is the ideology that forms the base of a theocratic absolutist state. It also epitomizes nationalistic doctrine. Chuch'e proposes that a nation should maintain an independent and sovereign relationship with other nations thereby becoming its own master and preventing and discouraging the possibility of being dominated by another nation. Dogma aside, the concept is actually somewhat racist and altogether xenophobic.

Kim Il-Sung devoted a full decade (1956-66) to the conceptualization of chuch'e. It was ultimately a means to rationalize the process of concentrating authority and power into his hands. By 1972, the North Korean party newspaper Nodong Sinmun had reported chuch'e replaced the traditional political culture based on Confucian ethics and that it had become "the guiding compass for carrying on successfully our revolution...."⁴

The overwhelmingly striking facet of North Korean life to a group of Korean-American scholars visiting there in 1981 was the absolute nature of political-social conformity.* They had observed that in the North two ritualistic behaviors were exhibited; the use of specific honorific expressions with

respect to Kim and his son and the continual and emphasized references to them in "expounding things both mundane and exalted." ⁵ Of the thousands of references to Kim Il-Sung that were heard, most used the terms "Great Leader" or "the Respected and Beloved Leader." Only once or twice did they hear him referred to as merely "President Kim Il-Sung."⁶

North Koreans feel they live in a free and dynamic society that is that way because there are no foreign predators-- particularly the Japanese-- in their country. Their concept of freedom is the absence of foreign masters and is not measured by individual freedoms. Even today, they are told daily of the humiliation and exploitation suffered in the thirty-six years under Japanese colonial rule. The ruling elites ensure the past is not forgotten and that the younger generation is constantly conscious of Korea's history as they tell it.⁷

REUNIFICATION. The goal of national reunification is the ultimate source for understanding North Korea's behavior internally and internationally. Since his armed attempt in 1950 to accomplish that end, Kim Il-Sung has engraved in his countrymen the obsessive notion of "liberating" the South Koreans from "the colonial fascist rule of the U.S. imperialists" and the "murdering, lackey, stooge, traitor,

* As noted in the collection of essays by seven Korean-American political science professors who visited North Korea in 1981. See C.I. Eugene Kim and B.C. Koh, eds., Journey to North Korea: Personal Perceptions. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983.

puppet clique" of the South.** In this dogma lies the foundation of domestic and foreign policy.

In the North, national reunification is now proclaimed the highest policy goal of both the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and the state.⁸ A constant element in North Korea's unification policy since the 1950s is the "strategy of three revolutionary forces."⁹ These forces are to be developed in three areas: North Korea, South Korea and the other nations of the world.

The initial need is for a dynamic and powerful revolutionary base in North Korea, one that possesses strong political, economic and military capabilities. It is imperative, Kim Il-Sung feels, that the North Korean people be "educated and remolded" into dedicated communist revolutionaries to build and perpetuate the base.

Next, is to stimulate and support revolutionary forces in South Korea. The aims are to organize a wide variety of organizations committed to the various forms of struggle. Whether their nature is overt or covert; violent or non-violent; economic, political or social; and regardless of composition, student, intellectual or others; their aim is to constantly attack and weaken the ruling government and the counter-revolutionary forces, mainly the R.O.K. Army.

The international revolutionary forces are also targeted

** Recurring rhetoric used by North Korean official news agencies and government officials in most sanctioned communiques in referring to the U.S. and South Korea. Examples abound in reports printed in the daily Foreign Broadcast Information Service's, "Asia and Pacific."

for support. Moreover, exploitation of "frictions and conditions" among imperialist nations is sought with the end result of both being to isolate the United States in the world arena and prompt U.S. withdrawal where and whenever possible.

Totally rigid in their views, excessive ethnocentrism and exaggerated nationalism bestow a sense of supreme virtue in ideal, person and action throughout the North Korean population. Those who do not subscribe to the same philosophy are seen as contemptable and thus inferior.

In a very real sense, their attitudes are counter to the inner logic of reunification. Despite certain statements to the effect that the North would accept any mutually agreed upon form of government, it is unrealistic to expect such a smooth transition. Would people so thoroughly indoctrinated in both ideology and life style change and accept an open democratic system? Would the tainted South have to be reeducated in a similar venue as the North Vietnamese do to their southern brothers?

Professor Edward A. Olsen correctly describes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) when he observes:

North Korea is a nation-state version of those paranoid 'survivalists' in U.S. society who, armed to the teeth, wait for the final assault by alien forces on their way of life. Pyongyang neither trusts nor relies on any external power to protect or rescue it, despite its frequent¹⁰ and flowery rhetoric about socialist brotherhood.

It would be a very benign situation if it were assured that they would wait for the final assault. Their seige

mentality is, unfortunately, not merely defensive in nature. For ultimately, as expressed in chuch'e, North Korea perceives its survival is tied to the liberation of the South.¹¹

Any significant escalation in the Korean arms race is likely to be brought about by the actions of the external powers. Substantial increases in the arming of the South validates North Korean plans for reciprocal measures. Outside powers are then more sympathetic to requests for aid. As with any form of assistance, the increased burden of support can also carry with it implications of increased say in the affairs of the receiving nation. North Korea would then experience a deviation from its staunch self reliant position.

The possibility of an accidental war seems greater than one resulting from an arms race. Ever since the armistice, intentional armed provocations and accidental incidents have been common occurrences. Attempts to capitalize on destabilizing events in the other country, such as Kim Il-Sung's death or popular dissent in the South, could provoke the nation in duress to respond with force.¹²

A number of scenarios exist whereby hostilities could result from North Korean actions.

The aging North Korean communist leader could come to believe that time is running out and the opportunity to use military force to reunify the peninsula is drawing to a close. The opportunity is dwindling based on Kim's age to be sure, but also relative to trends in the increasing inferiority of the

North compared to the South in economic, military and political terms. The "Great Leader" could perceive it as his last chance to fulfill a lifelong professed crusade to unite Korea.

The issue of leadership succession can give rise to uncertain stability and intentions. In the post-Kim vacuum, a power struggle or collective leadership could emerge in opposition to the designated ascendancy of Kim Jong-Il to replace his father as the nation's leader. The possibility always exists of reduced tensions with the South to enable the North to concentrate more on needed economic development and away from the drain of a dominating military oriented economy. Considering the decades of fanatical indoctrination, isolation and restrictive ideology, prospects for movement in the opposite direction are at least as likely. Leaders of all political orientation have relied on a clear, or sometimes fabricated, threat to gain or maintain power. Tensions could reasonably be expected to remain constant or even worsen. In a worst case, successor zealotry and paranoia cultivated from a lifetime of dedicated cause worship could manifest itself in urges to accomplish the destiny of chuch'e.

Provocative North Korean pronouncements can not be discounted as mere rhetoric. The 1950 invasion isn't the only reminder of the aggressive nature of the North. Armistice violations abound. The North has committed some notable acts that have garnered the attention of the world.

In 1968, a thirty-one man North Korean commando unit

attacked the South Korean "Blue House" in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung-Hee. They failed, but his wife was killed in the assault.

Two days later the USS Pueblo was seized. The 82 surviving crewmen, one sailor died, were held for 335 days in the Communist North. The brutality of their inhumane ordeal is widely known.

At least three large scale invasion tunnels have been discovered since 1974.¹³ These invasion routes skirt under the DMZ and can accommodate three or four soldiers abreast to move through them. They are capable of delivering regiment size formations to southern soil in a relatively short period of time. Seismic monitoring reveals continued attempts at tunneling under the DMZ.

In 1976, two U.S. Army officers were murdered at Panmunjom. North Koreans attacked a clean-up work detail of U.S./South Korean soldiers and without warning hacked to death with axes the American officers.

North Korean agents planted a bomb, in 1983, at Rangoon's Martyr's Mausoleum where President Chun Doo-Hwan was scheduled to lay a wreath. Seventeen South Koreans were killed, including four cabinet members, and 14 other members of Chun's entourage were injured in the blast.

SOUTH KOREAN THREATS

There exists in South Korea conditions and factors that create an environment where the likelihood of hostilities is

increased instead of decreased.

INTERNAL DESTABILIZATION. A survey conducted by the National Police Headquarters cited 123 dissident groups operating across the country and revealed that 19 came into being this year.¹⁴ The survey stated 23 of the 123 are "relatively" apolitical in nature, but that the remaining 100 play major roles in anti-government demonstrations. According to the survey, the 100 "problematic" groups have a combined total membership of approximately 35,000.

Protests at major universities throughout the nation have become common. The deaths of between 1,000-2,000 demonstrators by Government forces in the city of Kwangju shortly after President Chun assumed power in 1980 is a bond for opposition members of all degrees. In November of 1986, a contingent of 70,000 riot policemen were deployed in Seoul to block an opposition rally in the downtown section.¹⁵

Vocal opposition is a product of the democratic system. The view from the North could easily misinterpret the underlying motivations for the opposition and read it as support for the North; a call for liberation. The North might believe that a large and popular revolutionary faction in the South is sending a signal for assistance. The situation is compatible with North Korea's concept of the "three revolutionary forces" in obtaining the South's freedom.

NATIONALISM. The Koreans have accomplished a great deal in a relatively short time span. They have progressed from a

totally dependent client of the United States to a nation that yearns for a greater degree of respect and recognition on the world stage. Koreans are no longer satisfied with the thirty-five year teacher-student relationship between their nation and the United States. They feel their performance in a wide array of endeavors validates their claim of a partner relationship.

The attitude is readily perceived in contacts with the officers of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). The complex command and control systems in Korea are under the dominion of the senior U.S. military officer stationed in-country. Many Koreans question the placement of an American in charge of all forces in Korea and would prefer that position occupied by a Korean.

The significance of that command structure should not be minimized. The objectivity an "outsider" provides in sibling disputes can be the mediating factor that diverts hostilities. Alterations in the CFC could allow the R.O.K. to align the missions of that organization closer to their national interests and objectives vice those of the United States.

Recall the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Either side can terminate the Treaty after a notice of one year. The withdrawal issue is always viewed from an assumption the United States makes the decision to remove the troops. The time may be on the horizon when the request comes from the South Koreans if nationalism runs unbridled.

The general scenario is not without precedent.¹⁶ After

World War II, the removal of the Allied Military Government had allowed Korean President Syngman Rhee to use his security police arbitrarily and to imprison many of his opponents. In February of 1949 he declared he could defeat North Korea in two weeks. That October he "boasted" he could take Pyongyang within three days. The United States had lost its influence to divert provocation.

As an analyst noted, "A great power tends to promote alliances on the basis of a threat to the balance in the whole international system. The small power makes alliances in terms of a threat to its local balance. Inevitably, conflicts in perspectives occur."¹⁷

KUMGANGSAN DAM. The Koreans see the Kumgangsan Dam project in the north looming as a grave threat to their security. It is estimated that the dam is designed to hold back 20 billion metric tons of water and is to be built on the source of the Han River that flows from north to south and runs through Seoul.

The South sees ominous military implications. The South Korean Defense Minister, Yi Ki-Paek, stated that if the dam collapsed due to a natural calamity or was destroyed, the consequent floods would imperil the survival of the 15 million people in the Han River Valley and isolate the armed forces units north of the river. He further stated that should the North continue the dam project, the South would "be compelled to take self-defensive measures before the threat becomes a

reality and that north Korea must be held responsible for any and all consequences of this."¹⁸

Two weeks later, South Korean Culture and Information Minister Yi Won-Hong warned Pyongyang that Seoul will take "all proper and necessary measures" if the North defies South Korea's demand to terminate the project. He then said North Korea's attempt to build the dam is tantamount to the self-destruction of the nation and could escalate tensions on the peninsula to the highest level since the 1950-53 Korean War.¹⁹

The United Nations intends to intervene to seek a peaceful resolution. U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller, it was reported, had "underlined dialogue" in his recent talks with the North Korean U.N. observer on the settlement of the dam conflict.²⁰

CHAPTER VII

IMPACT FACTORS

There are a number of factors that can have an impact on the positioning of U.S. forces in Korea. Although each is not presented in this study, the factors addressed here carry implications that bear on the issue directly and indirectly.

THE U.S.S.R. AND NE ASIA

The Soviet Union, by reason of geography, is an East Asian player. Much of Soviet Siberia borders China and Mongolia and Russia's Pacific Coast is in proximity to China, Korea and Japan. An estimated 20 percent of the Soviet population, 50 million people, are Asians.¹

Because it is a world power, the Soviet Union is in direct competition with the United States in this region. Soviet military power, as discussed in a previous chapter, has reflected their increased interest in the area.

Foremost, through Soviet eyes, is an expansion of their military power and influence in Northeast Asia while correspondingly weakening the position of the United States there. The United States still possesses the advantage due to alliance treaties, basing of forces and economic and ideological influences.

Table VII-1 depicts some of the major interests and objectives of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia.

TABLE VII-1

U.S.S.R. IN NORTHEAST ASIA

<u>INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES</u>	<u>PERCEIVED THREATS</u>
Global expansionism, expanded power in NE Asia	U.S.-Japan- China entente versus U.S.S.R.
Weaken U.S. position in NE Asia	Nuclear capability by Japan or South Korea
Containment of China	Two-Front war prospect
Strengthen ties with North Korea; weaken Chinese ties	
Maintain "controlled tension" in Korea	
Inhibit Japanese military growth	

(Source: Adapted from William M. Carpenter, et al., U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia (Arlington, VA: SRI International, 1978))

The Soviets have increased contact with the North Koreans. Kim Il-Sung visited the U.S.S.R. in October of 1986. Nodong Sinmun's estimation of the stature of that meeting was evident in the title of its editorial: "An Epochal Event Which Has Added a Brilliant Chapter to the History of Korean-Soviet Friendship."² Without questioning the precise impact of this event, it does point out that increased interaction between the two countries has occurred. Whether the state visit was in conjunction with North Korean requests for assistance or an attempt by Kim Il-Sung to obtain support for his son as successor to power, it displays a strengthening of relations.

History is replete with examples of alliances that served diametric purposes or produced opposite consequences. Some

induced war while others acted as a force of moderation. Of concern here is the direction of movement of a strong Soviet-North Korean alliance.

It is a formidable task to predict where a close Soviet-North Korean association would lead. At least for the present, it is in the U.S.S.R.'s best interest to have peace on the peninsula. Professor Donald S. Zagoria points out, "The Soviet's cannot afford to let Pyongyang win or lose a new Korean war."³ He explained that a North Korean loss would have grave psychological and political impacts among other Soviet allies and treaty partners. A North Korean victory would risk Soviet-American military confrontation on the Soviet border thus ruining the chance for improved relations, risk Chinese intervention and produce pressure within Japan to remilitarize.

Strategies are not static. At a future point in time, war on the peninsula might well be in the Soviet's best interest. At that juncture, Russian support to North Korea could be the deciding factor to recreate the attack of 1950. In this case, the absence of the American "tripwire" would be an even greater determinant in the North's decision process.

JAPAN REARMED

Japan is often criticized for not contributing enough to its own defense. Some even say that since World War II Japan has had a "free ride" on South Korea's security. Japan's increased defense spending is welcomed by many in the United States as a symbol of commitment. It is seen as a possible

signal for further militarization that would surely improve the overall security capability of the U.S.-Korea-Japan alliance. The prospect of a strong militarized Japan does not meet with similar enthusiasm throughout Asia.

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro has expressed a strong desire to lift Japan's defense budget limit of 1 percent of the GNP; a limit imposed by the Liberal-Democratic Party controlled government, as is the case now, in 1976. This was done to prevent rapid growth in Japan's defense capability. Regardless of self-imposed limits, the five-year defense plan, 1986-1990, will exceed that ceiling.⁴

Japan has acquired expanded defense responsibilities. The Self-Defense Forces now are charged with the role of guarding the main sea lanes 1,000 nautical miles out from the coastal shores of Japan. While many bemoan the view Japan doesn't pay its share, today Japan's defense spending ranks eighth in the world.⁵

From a Korean, and virtually every other Asian perspective, resurgence in Japanese military might and rearmament could result in risks that would prove more harmful than beneficial.⁶ Suspicion as a result of a sense of history is still strong in the minds of many Asians, Koreans in particular.

As might be expected, North Korea takes a dim view of a militarized Japanese neighbor. In 1984, Kim Il-Sung held an interview with a delegation from the Tass News Agency. During

the interview Kim spoke out on the threat of the revival of Japanese militarism.⁷ The theme was stated in harsher terms in the official North Korean newspaper in November 1986: "The evil designs of the Japanese militarist forces for overseas expansion is becoming more open. This aggravates tension on the Korean peninsula and the Asian region and increases the danger of nuclear war."⁸

The strength of Asian nation resentment and suspicion of Japanese militarism was illustrated when Prime Minister Nakasone visited Yasukuni Shrine. On the 40th anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender, he was the first postwar prime minister to pay an official state visit to the shrine that is dedicated to the nation's war dead. The visit was strongly criticized by Pacific nations and inside Japan as well.⁹

Americans would likely be surprised at the furor created over the simple visit of a prime minister to a shrine. It is a commonplace, and one would think appropriate, traditional and understandable, action for a leader of a nation. To understand the reaction, a review of the significance of that shrine and Japan's past imperialistic policies are in order.

In the 1800s, the religion of Shinto possessed a decidedly nationalistic flavor. Later, it became established as the state religion and the teachings viewed the emperor as a living god. The Shinto shrines were government institutions that during the war years the Japanese people were compelled to worship. Increased militarism in the 1930s went hand in hand

with the philosophy of State Shinto. This nationalistic sentiment evolved from the state's religion that claimed Japan was a sacred nation. During this period, citizens riding public transportation were required to bow whenever a shrine was passed. Yasukuni Shrine is one of the two most revered shrines since it is the chief "gokoku" ("defending the nation" or soldier's cemetery) shrine. There are nearly 2.5 million people interned there.

After the end of the war, State Shinto was dismantled by the Allied forces to separate religion and state and aid in the democratization of Japan.

Japan's imperialistic ventures in China, Korea, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries are remembered by the people of those nations and many still harbor ill feelings. Their sense of history, it appears, is more persistent than that of most Americans. Deng Xiaoping spoke the sentiments held by many Asians when he told a Japan Socialist Party mission to China, "History remains history, even though one can forget it. It is important to apply the lessons of the past to build the future. Japanese politicians should be more careful of their individual actions." Pen Zhen, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress was more to the point. He told members of Japan's Liberal-Democratic Party (Nakasone's political party) that, "Prime Minister Nakasone's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine has hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. It's better to

desist from actions that can only harm both our peoples."¹⁰ The New China News Agency was blunt in its proclamation: "The official visit to Yasukuni Shrine blurs the consequences of the war of aggression pursued by militaristic Japan and is an affront to the people of Asia."¹¹

DEMOGRAPHICS

Korean demographics could have a dramatic effect on U.S. force presence. Pressure from within the R.O.K. might build to a point where the Koreans desire the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Personal experiences and discussions inside Korea, interviews with Korean specialists in the State Department and the Department of the Army and a Commander in Chief (CINC) of the CFC all confirm the observations of a former ambassador to Korea. Dr. Richard L. Walker, Asian specialist and Ambassador to Korea from 1981-1986, stated in a recent interview that the younger Koreans don't have "an inbuilt, automatic deference to the United States." There is a division in attitudes between respect by the older generation and questioning by the young. Walker went on to say that the older generation which remembers the Korean War, "really knows of our common-spilled blood. However, a new generation's come along that has no memory of the war."¹²

A new pattern is emerging in student protests. An anti-American sentiment has come into being.¹³ In past times, protests were exclusively directed at internal symbols. In recent years students have moved to occupy the United States

Embassy, a Korean-American bank and the American cultural center. The most dramatic statement came from a student who doused himself with gasoline and set himself on fire. As he became engulfed with flames, he shouted, "Out with U.S. imperialists!" and jumped off a third -story ledge at Seoul National University.¹⁴

The younger generation doesn't associate South Korean affluence with American stewardship. Neither have they experienced the slavery of Japanese occupation or the ravages of war. They tend to view the threat from the North in less harsh terms.

Evolving patterns in the nation's power structure, away from the traditional military breeding ground, would likely produce different policies and stress other methods for achieving national goals. The longstanding importance of the U.S.-Korean relationship might diminish, most notably in the military realm.

TRADE

The United States is in a similar position with Japan and Korea when economic issues are linked to defense issues. U.S. trade defecits have prompted calls for protectionist legislation in an effort to offset the advantage those two nations presently enjoy.

Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari said Japan does not want to link trade friction with the United States with increasing Japan's defense budget. He continued and stated Japan will not

accept such a linkage and he believes the U.S. Government does not intend to connect the two.¹⁵

A South Korean editorial exclaimed "drastic market-opening steps coerced by the Americans have touched off acute repercussions from domestic industries."¹⁶ In an effort to reduce the United States' nearly \$7 billion trade deficit with Korea,¹⁷ it is feared the U.S. Congress will impose "indiscriminate" and "arm-twisting" sanctions against its trading partners.

Trade friction can spill over into other areas. Each side responds in their defense. A backlash on either the part of the United States or Korea might incorrectly attack defense issues. Short term decisions that attempt to quell emotions can adversely affect the clear logic of long term defense planning.

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Korean question must be addressed from a moral and ethical perspective. Why? Because the American politically conscious elite will confine the issue to those parameters when Korea is next in the political spotlight.

With the upcoming 1988 Olympic Games and a scheduled presidential election the same year, opposition groups have an excellent opportunity to obtain worldwide attention. Increased levels of violence in protests will likely be countered with government repression. It is the Korean government's reactions that will garner the scrutiny of the American elites. Morality and ethics in international relations, in the American liberal

spirit, will become the rallying point.

Idealism, usually out of necessity, gives way to pragmatism in policy formulation. Nevertheless, Americans still revert to moral and ethical principles for justification of action and as the foundation of policy. Politicians and populace alike show a distinct affinity for injecting and upholding moral principles in the national persona. Each U.S. president proclaims lofty values as a trademark of American behavior and character. So, as unpalatable as some realists view morality as a consideration, or worse yet determinant, it is a factor in the development of policy.

A number of issues emerge in the moral plane concerning American commitment in the form of our ground forces. Should the R.O.K. develop militarily to a point where it is reasonable to believe they can respond to an attack from the North, isn't it still a responsible stance to make every effort to avert that eventuality? Granted, it has been some time since the illusion that the United States could meet every peacekeeping challenge globally; Korea is not the typical situation. It is within American means and compatible with other interests to honor stated and implied commitments.

President Truman declared that, "We are fighting in Korea to carry out our commitment of honor to the South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the United States is unestimable in time of adversity."¹⁸ Was (is) there substance to his statement, or was it only predictable

rhetoric? South Korea was one of the few "allies" that stood by the united States in its most trying period of adversity. At a time when most allies could not muster verbal support, South Korea sent 300,000 troops to Vietnam between 1965-1972, peaking the troop level at any given time at 55,000.

Human rights was a central theme in Carter's formulation of foreign policy. In 1979, when troop withdrawals were last pressed, surveys were conducted to gage public opinion on the Korean condition. One question asked was "What is your impression of the situation in South Korea/North Korea concerning human rights?"¹⁹ The response is reflected below.

	South Korea	North Korea
Very favorable	7%	4%
Somewhat favorable	25	14
Somewhat unfavorable	24	24
Very unfavorable	15	29
Don't know	29	29

Another question asked "Would you favor or oppose making the security commitment to South Korea conditional upon an improvement in the human rights situation there?"²⁰

Favor	49%
Oppose	26
Don't know	25

Were the perceptions of the human rights situation in South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea surprising in light of the nature of the relative forms of governments and societies being compared? Not necessarily. Judgments are made based on facts

available; the knowledge one has in a subject area. The public obtains the majority of its information about foreign countries and overseas events from television, newspapers and magazines. This is acutely true in Korea's case since the nation is not one that is studied at any length, if at all, in American classrooms. In 1977, the year after the indisputable atrocity of the axe murder of two American officers by the North Koreans, The New York Times ran 48 rights related stories on South Korea and 0 on North Korea; in 1980 it ran 154 such stories on South Korea and 2 on the North. For The Washington Post the figures were 21 and 1 for 1977 and 84 and 0 for 1980.²¹

In a 1985 article entitled "Morality and Foreign Policy," George F. Kennan asserted:

The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality...A concept of national security that ignores this reality and, above all, one that fails to concede the same legitimacy to the security needs of others that it claims for its own, lays itself open to the same moral reproach from which, in normal circumstances, it would be immune.²²

How would Washington react if there existed a DMZ between the United States and the Soviet Union 30 miles north of the capitol, the approximate distance to Baltimore? That is exactly the situation faced by Seoul. Each nation reacts in its interests and from its frame of reference. For the South Koreans, the threat to their sovereignty is real. Those in

power remember the slavery of the Japanese. They lived the horrors of war. Actions taken by the Korean government cannot be transferred to the American experience.

Inclinations to arbitrarily and customarily evaluate and prescribe human rights issues in Korea against an American standard are ill-conceived. As Kennan notes, "there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles."²³

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

1. The presence of U.S. ground combat troops, as currently positioned and configured, continues to be the singlemost factor that deters Northern aggression and is instrumental in the stability of the Korean peninsula. They perform a role that cannot be duplicated by other U.S. forces. Neither can the stability of the peninsula be insured by a sufficiently manned, equipped and trained South Korean military.

2. The benefits derived by the United States from the contingent of U.S. forces in Korea warrants the risks they pose. General Richard G. Stilwell, former CINC, flatly stated the troops in South Korea "have a value all out of proportion to their numbers in maintaining an environment of assurance and deterrence on the peninsula. Their relevance, however, extends far beyond the boundries of the Land of the Morning Calm."¹

It is appropriate to recall Carter's quote on the nature of the situation. For his evaluation of the dilemma is precisely the simplified question to many .

The essence of the question is, is our country committed on a permanent basis to keep troops in South Korea even if they are not needed to maintain the stability of that peninsula?²

That is by no means the "essence of the question." It may be a consideration under post-war American policy; it could only be the question should Korea or Northeast Asia fall from the ranks of our vital interests or should the United States retrench in the Pacific. The fault with this line of thought is that the answer is somewhat irrelevant since the speaker has erred in step one of the problem solving technique, that is, identify the problem.

As stated, the query presumes that the only function of U.S. ground combat troops in the R.O.K. is to aid in the maintenance of stability there. Undeniably the primary purpose, the collateral purposes it serves should not be obscured.

The question, as Carter termed it, is more appropriately viewed as a portion of, and agent in, the development of the Pacific basin. In that regard, it is judicious to borrow from Dr. Richard H. Soloman, Director of Policy Planning Staff, State Department, in his dictum on American security emphasis and the Pacific basin. He proposed, "The issue is not where we are, but where we are going; not the reality of the present, but the opportunities of the future."³ Korea is an integral variable in the opportunities of the future.

3. Internal unrest in the Republic of Korea should not become the overwhelming concern of the U.S. government that subordinates higher interests and issues. The United States

can and should exert influence within its means to support the movement toward increased democratization. Influence digressing to coercion will not further the position of either nation.

Before succumbing to the euphoric titilation of a cause, politicians and activists would do well to recall the wisdom of Reinhold Niebuhr, one of America's foremost theologians and scholars in political philosophy and ethics. In speaking on the struggle for justice in human society, he felt that moralist confusion resulted from complete disregard of the "political necessities" and failure "to recognise those elements in man's collective behavior which belong to the order of nature and can never be brought completely under the dominion of reason or conscience."⁴ He further concluded, "While no state can maintain its unity purely by coercion neither can it preserve itself without coercion."⁵ This does not imply a blind acceptance of circumstances because it is the nature of humans. Rather, it is a learned reminder of reality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue present U.S. force structure in Korea until after the post-Kim Il-Sung regime has developed and its character and direction can be evaluated.

Despite the multitude of ulterior purposes the force presence serves, averting war is its forte. The thirty-five year track record cannot be discounted. To remove the safety feature from such a delicate balance could easily lead to

conflict.

2. Develop a public information campaign to counter the bias of the media. American policymakers must be able to explain and justify to its constituency Korea's value to the United States. The campaign can be readily incorporated into the programs that will develop as a prelude to the 1988 Olympics.

Many of the politically conscience elite bemoan our relationships with governments that don't subscribe to human rights in the American vernacular. Consequently, they vent their considerable support against our association with that government, irrespective of the higher purposes it serves or of the relativity of the displeased situation in its historical or regional context. It is essential to public understanding that a balanced portrayal of situations is afforded.

3. Initiate and conduct a long range attitudinal survey to assess the opinions of the various segments of the Korean populace. Through an anticipation of issues, the United States can produce proactive initiatives instead of having to respond in the reactive mode.

APPENDIX I

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October, 1, 1953

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all the peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, in English and Korean languages, this first day of October 1953.

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Republic of Korea:

Y.T. PYUN

NOTE: Ratified by Congress on January 26, 1954.

NOTES

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5. Phil Williams, "United States Defence Policy," John Faylis et al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (New York: Holmes and Meirer Publishers, Inc., 1975), p. 207.
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9. Reasons for withdrawal as stated in body of letters with identical text addressed to Walter Mondale, President of the Senate, Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Robert Byrd, Majority Leader of the Senate. Congressional Quarterly Inc., Presidency 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1978), p.60-A.

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